Evolution of the Bargain 1954–1984

Abstract

It is difficult to look at the roots of the original transatlantic bargain without being impressed by the persistence of some factors. After 30 years, US policy toward the alliance is debated by Congress in virtually the same terms that it was in the early 1950s. United States administrations remain divided internally concerning the bargain but consistently defend it in the face of congressional skepticism. France still worries about Germany, even though it now is a soft German line that worries Paris most, rather than the specter of a German power move toward reunification. The Soviet Union still deploys substantial military forces to NATO’s east; Moscow controls its East European buffer zone with somewhat more finesse than in the 1950s; and the Soviets try to diminish Western concerns about their intentions by means of proposals for nuclear-free zones, no first use declarations, and other declaratory approaches of more political than military significance. No arrangement for European security has yet been advanced from any quarter which has promised convincingly to serve American or European interests better than some form of transatlantic bargain.