Abstract

While the Foreign Office felt that the successful Moscow Conference should be followed up by an imaginative political initiative or a generous gesture of good will, the Combined Chiefs of Staff took the opposite view. They felt that the time had come to make some demands on the Russians. To the Combined Chiefs the Moscow Conference was yet another exercise in appeasement. Their view was that

At the Moscow Conference the United States and British representatives were primarily engaged in explaining and defending their own position. In future the United States and Great Britain should make specific requests of the Soviets.

Keywords

Europe Steam Radar Assure Expense 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes and References

  1. 4.
    Lieutenant-General Sir Giffard Martel, An Outspoken Soldier: His Views and Memoirs (London, 1949) p. 221.Google Scholar
  2. 15.
    Lord Moran, Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival 1940–1965 (London, 1966) 28 Nov. 1943.Google Scholar
  3. 31.
    Arthur Bryant, Triumph in the West (London, 1959) p. 140.Google Scholar
  4. 58.
    Vojtech Mastny, Russia’s Road to the Cold War (New York, 1979) pp. 133–44.Google Scholar
  5. 62.
    Victor Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War 1941–1947 (London, 1982) p. 191.Google Scholar
  6. 64.
    See particularly: Nikolai Tolstoy, Victims of Yalta (London, 1977) and Stalin’s Secret War (London, 1981).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Martin Kitchen 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin Kitchen

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations