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Abstract

We now address the momentous question left over from the previous discussion: what are the chances of stopping or limiting a nuclear conflict once begun and preventing escalation to a full-scale nuclear war? As President Reagan found to his cost in the autumn of 1981, leading statesmen are likely to earn more pain than profit from discussing the question publicly. Here truly is an area where, if America sneezes, Europe will catch cold. In the whole field of dynamic stability, however, there is no more critical question. If the answer should be that the chances of stopping or limiting nuclear war are not good, the further question would arise whether there are any circumstances in which it would be rational to initiate the use of nuclear weapons.

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Notes and References

  1. The conceptual framework of this chapter is taken from the works of Thomas C. Schelling cited in note 1 of chapter 2 and note 1 of chapter 10. The judgements are the author’s own.

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  2. I owe this way of expressing the role of theatre nuclear weapons to Michael Quinlan.

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  3. See the discussion in chapter 13 and note 2 of chapter 13.

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  4. See chapter 7.

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  5. NATO’s ageing ADMs would have to be emplaced before the war began and before the conventional battle was decided, and their effects would, ex hypothesi, be felt on NATO territory (see Robert S. McNamara (note 13 of chapter 2)).

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  6. See chapter 11.

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  7. See chapter 8 and note 4 to chapter 8.

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© 1986 A.J.C. Edwards

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Edwards, A.J.C. (1986). Limiting Nuclear War. In: Nuclear Weapons, the Balance of Terror, the Quest for Peace. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08131-8_12

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