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Standard Criticisms of the Free Market Argument

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Abstract

Chapter 1 discusses value judgments or assumptions upon which the free market argument is based. For instance, the argument is individualistic in that its advocates believe that the individual is the fundamental unit of the social structure. To the extent that one does not share this assumption, one is likely to disagree with free market conclusions. Likewise, one must accept the relevance and appropriateness of particular economic models before one can accept the invisible-hand laissez-faire faith assumption that social outcomes will be optimal if individuals are left free to barter and exchange. Similarly, the process orientation and belief in an equity-efficiency tradeoff are intimately related to and dependent on assumptions concerning the place of the individual in the social order and stand or fall with one’s view on that issue.

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Notes

  1. See Jerry Green and Jean Jacques Laffont, Incentives in Public Decision Making, Amsterdam: North Holland, 1979.

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  2. Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco: Holden Day, 1970.

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© 1985 St. Martin’s Press, Inc.

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Schotter, A. (1985). Standard Criticisms of the Free Market Argument. In: Free Market Economics. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08128-8_2

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