The United States, Britain and Argentina in the Years immediately after the Second World War

Abstract

Following the Argentine elections of February 1946, both London and Washington were forced to accept the existence of Perón’s regime with its policy of economic diversification. The questions faced by Britain and the US were the degree of industrialisation which was to occur and the method by which the policy was to be pursued. A division appeared to exist amongst Perón’s advisers on these issues and two broad groups could be identified, struggling for control of economic policy. ‘Moderates’, such as Bramuglia, the Foreign Minister, and the technicians at the Central Bank, were believed to favour a policy of gradual industrialisation in cooperation with Argentina’s major trading partners. Their economic strategy embraced free enterprise at home and ‘reasonable’ prices for Argentine produce in world markets. ‘Extremists’, such as Miranda, head of the Economic Council, rejected this approach, arguing that Argentina must not allow the pace and direction of industrial development to be dictated from abroad. Miranda advocated rapid industrialisation under State control financed by high prices for agricultural exports. He was uninterested in the impact of such policies on Argentina’s trading partners, emphasising instead the overriding need to establish economic ‘independence’ as soon as possible.¹