Central Banking with the Benefit of Hindsight

  • Jelle Zijlstra

Abstract

It is well-nigh indisputable that the present time is far from easy for central banks and their governors. Not only must they do their work under difficult circumstances but they are also subject to a degree of public and political interest which does nothing to ease their burden, let alone make it pleasurable. My intention here is to discuss this subject against a background of nearly fifteen years’ experience as President of the Netherlands Bank and of a similar period as President of that remarkable institution, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) at Basle.

Keywords

Europe Assure Milton Amaze OPEC 

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Notes

  1. 1.
    M. Friedman and A. J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States. 1867–1970 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    M. Friedman, Counter-revolution in Monetary Theory (Westminster: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1970).Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    A. Lamfalussy, Observation de règles ou politique discrétionnaire: Essai sur la politique monétaire dans un milieu inflationniste (Bâle: Banque de Règlements Internationaux, 1981).Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    A. F. Burns, ’The Anguish of Central Banking’ (Chapter 7 of this volume).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jelle Zijlstra

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