Civil War and the American Economy: Conclusions

Abstract

In contrast to the historiography of the South, there is a tradition of describing, indeed of emphasising, the gains the North derived from its victory in 1865. That tradition stems largely from the writings of historians (such as Charles Beard and Louis Hacker) who were disposed to perceive events as tragic as the American Civil War as a ‘watershed’ or ‘turning point’ in the economic life of the nation. But so many influences were at work in the economy that all claims made for the beneficient effects of war on the North must be carefully specified, connections with structural change identified and their contribution to the growth rate measured. Above all, historians now insist that a proper economic appraisal of war should be conducted within a framework which compares its costs and benefits with other policy options available at the time. For example, any scheme to compensate white Southerners for the emancipation of slaves would have cost Northern taxpayers far less than war. With hindsight, it is even difficult to conceive how the permanent secession of slave states from the Union might have damaged the economic prospects for the North. Although slaves gained enormously from the Civil War there can be no presumption that the political union which survived a costly attempt to break it up constituted an optimal political unit for a long-run economic progress.