Abstract
The strategic dichotomy dividing America and Europe was evident when the consequences of nuclear war became potentially as serious for the USA as they had been for the USSR since World War II. This increased the USA’s strategic dependence on Western Europe for deterring the Soviet Union and diminished Western Europe’s faith in the reduced credibility of the American nuclear umbrella. The new strategic environment forced a re-alignment of interests within the Western alliance system. States were obliged to choose between the two contending strategies in the circumstances of a delicate balance of terror; that is, between massive retaliation and flexible response. Neither was mutually exclusive, for some degree of massive retaliation is even implicit in the flexible response doctrine.
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Notes
Geoffrey Williams, The Permanent Alliance: the European-American Partnership, 1945–1984 (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1977) pp. 178–98.
Ivor Richard, Europe or the Open Sea? (London, Charles Knight, 1971) pp. 20–6.
See a perspective study by L. W. Martin British Defence Policy: the Long Recessional, Adelphi Paper no. 61 (IISS, 1969).
Geoffrey Williams Natural Alliance for the West (Atlantic Trade Study, 1969) pp. 16–22.
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© 1986 Geoffrey Lee Williams and Alan Lee Williams
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Williams, G.L., Williams, A.L. (1986). The Growth of the Strategic Dichotomy. In: The European Defence Initiative. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07825-7_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07825-7_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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Online ISBN: 978-1-349-07825-7
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