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Tacit Agreements

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Abstract

Consensus bargaining is most possible over common objectives that can readily be reduced to numerical calculations, like parity, reductions, and greater survivability. Arms control and nuclear weapon strategists will have far more difficulty working on common approaches to broader concepts like strategic stability and the requirements of deterrence where there are no agreed definitions or means of implementation. In general, the more diffuse the objective, the greater the difficulty there can be in bridging differences between the two domestic camps.

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Notes

  1. See Barbara Tuchman, “The American People and Military Power in an Historical Perspective,” Adelphi Papers, No. 173 (Spring, 1982), pp. 5–13.

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  9. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 266.

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© 1984 Michael Krepon

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Krepon, M. (1984). Tacit Agreements. In: Strategic Stalemate: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in American Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07719-9_10

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