How Fragile a Super State?

  • Ronald Dore

Abstract

What difference does half a century make? The men whom Ernest Penrose taught in Nagoya are now either retired or occupying those honorific top posts which give the Japanese business world the appearance of a gerontocracy. The pace of change in their lifetime has been hectic, the secular trends — of output growth, increasing technical and intellectual sophistication, rising welfare levels, etc. — being overlaid by shorter-term swings of war and political upheaval of a violent kind. But what are the relations among those secular trends, institutional changes and cyclical upheavals? Is the Japan of the 1980s a less fragile society, with better adapted and more firmly established institutions, less liable to produce civil disorder or external military adventure, than the Japan of the 1920s and 1930s?

Keywords

Furnace Depression Income Stratification Straw 

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Ronald Dore and Radha Sinha 1987

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  • Ronald Dore

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