Abstract
The previous chapters have primarily pursued a neoclassical framework for evaluating alternative approaches to regulating natural monopoly. For neoclassical economics, scale economies provide the basic justification for monopoly, with regulation a sometimes necessary evil to control monopoly’s inherent allocative inefficiency. Neoclassical economics, however, says little about the variety of regulatory solutions devised for the natural monopoly problem. The new institutional economics, on the other hand, is concerned with questions such as the choice of one regulatory mode over another and the comparative efficiency of various hierarchical forms of organisation).1 By utilising a comparative institutional assessment, the new institutional economics has a means, at least qualitatively, of evaluating the variety of regulatory solutions that exist. In this chapter we illustrate such a comparative institutional assessment for several alternative governance structures for natural monopolies.
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© 1986 Michael A. Crew and Paul R. Kleindorfer
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Crew, M.A., Kleindorfer, P.R. (1986). Alternative Governance Structures for Natural Monopoly. In: The Economics of Public Utility Regulation. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07295-8_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07295-8_7
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-07297-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-07295-8
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