Abstract
The 1920s saw philosophers (for instance, Russell, Whitehead, Broad) recommend that events be seen not only as constituents in the world but as the only constituents. They wanted to get away from the metaphysics which had come down from Aristotle, where the primary constituents were substances sustaining attributes. Their event ontologies were worked out in the context of Relativity Theory, where ‘events’ were four-dimensional units, possibly of Space-Time. Things and even persons were to be seen as characters of events or series of events: Socrates was a long Socratic event, or a Socratic stretch of Space-Time. So in this ontology, events are not one kind of particular in a world which also contains other kinds of particulars. Everything is an event.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes and References
W. van O. Quine, Word and Object (New York and London, 1960) p. 171.
W. v. O. Quine, Ways of Paradox (Harvard, 1976 ) p. 260.
E. J. Lemmon in The Logic of Decision and Action pp. 96–103.
See A. N. Whitehead, The Concept of Nature (Cambridge, 1920) p. 145; pp. 186–7.
See Jaegwon Kim, ‘Events and their Descriptions’ in Essays in Honour of Carl G. Hempel, ed. N. Rescher (Reidel, 1969
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1984 Dorothy Emmet
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Emmet, D. (1984). Events and Non-events. In: The Effectiveness of Causes. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07165-4_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07165-4_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-07167-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-07165-4
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)