Amending the United States Constitution: A New Generation on Trial

  • Stephen L. Schechter


The winter of 1973 marks an important watershed in the history of amending the Constitution of the United States. Between 1961 and 1971 the Constitution had been amended four times, achieving an adoption record which had been surpassed only twice in American history (during the formative decade of the 1790s and the Progressive years, 1913–20). Moreover, there seemed every indication that the flurry of constitutional amendments would continue into the 1970s. On 22 March 1972, Congress proposed the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and within twelve months that amendment had been ratified by thirty state legislatures, with only eight more required for adoption.


Presidential Election American Politics State Legislature United States Constitution Constitutional Amendment 
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    The so-called ‘Article V convention method’ for proposing amendments is perhaps the thorniest of all the procedural issues concerned with the amendment process. On one side, there are those who view it as an unthinkable alternative that was never seriously intended to be used and would undoubtedly result in a ‘runaway’ convention. Representative of this view is Charles Black, ‘Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman’, Yale Law Journal (December 1972): 190. On the other side are those who see the convention method as a serious alternative mode for proposing amendments that was intended by the framers for use as a counterweight to Congress. This latter view would urge adoption of limited convention procedures by Congress to take the uncertainties out of calling such a convention. Representative of this view is Senator Sam Ervin (D-N. C.) who introduced measures in 1967, 1971 and 1973 for a federal constitutional convention procedures act. See Sam Ervin, ‘Proposèd Legislation to Implement the Convention Method of Amending the Constitution’, Michigan Law Review (March 1968). Also see Ann Stuart Diamond, ‘A Convention for Proposing Amendments: The Constitution’s Other Method’, in Stephen L. Schechter (ed.) The State of American Federalism: 1980, a special issue of PUBLIUS: The Journal of Federalism 1, nos. 3–4 (Summer 1981): 113–46.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Keith G. Banting and Richard Simeon 1985

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  • Stephen L. Schechter

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