Abstract
The object of this chapter is to discuss the theoretical character of Parsons’ theory of action, or more specifically what Parsons himself chooses to call the ‘action frame of reference’. While it is certainly true to argue that the substance of the general theory of action has been subject to a number of major transformations, this does not preclude the isolation of certain essential concepts that may be considered general throughout Parsons’ elaborations. These do not refer to any ubiquitous ‘doctrines’ to which Parsons adheres, or to any apparent metaphysical concerns which linger behind his theses, but to definite theoretical conditions which the theorisation of action (whether Weberian, structural-functionalist, or whatever) must invoke. It is to precisely these conceptual conditions that the following analysis is directed.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Weber has been slotted into a number of different categories, all of which claim to pin-point the ‘true’ Weber. Whereas the ultra-humanists claim that the genuine essence of Weber lies in the notion of the free constitutive subjectivity of the human individual (see Schutz’s analysis of Weber, op. cit.), other commentators argue that the ‘subjective’ sphere is only a factor in the Weberian conception of action, and that an equally significant role is played by various ‘material’ elements of social, economic and political life. This latter position is held by Gerth and Mills in their Introduction to From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, and J. Rex, Key Problems in Sociological Theory. An interesting example of such an argument is to be found in the article by J. Cohen, L. E. Hazelrigg and W. Pope, ‘DeParsonising Weber’, American Sociological Review, 40[2] (1975) pp. 229–41. Here Parsons is attacked for taking what is the third ‘interpretation’ of Weber in his insistence on the centrality of values and complexes of meaning. While the idea of a ‘true’ interpretation is clearly an awkward one, the two non-Parsonian interpretations are tasked to explain the Weber thesis on the ‘Protestant Ethic’ and on the massive importance given to systems of religious values.
See G. Kolko, ‘A Critique of Max Weber’s Philosophy of History’, Ethics LXX (1959) pp. 21–36.
Copyright information
© 1981 Stephen P. Savage
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Savage, S.P. (1981). The Structure of Action: Parsons’ Formulation of the Action Frame of Reference. In: The Theories of Talcott Parsons. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-06969-9_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-06969-9_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-36165-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-06969-9
eBook Packages: Palgrave Social & Cultural Studies CollectionSocial Sciences (R0)