Abstract
A main concern of economic theory is to explain how markets work. This task has been pursued recently with attention to details neglected in earlier studies. In addition, the scope of the investigation has been widened to address issues about the efficient organization of trade. The purpose of this exposition is to describe some of these developments.
The author is grateful for a Guggenheim Fellowship and for research support from the Office of Naval Research (ONR-N00014-79-C-0685) and the National Science Foundation (SES-81-08226) Thanks are due to John Roberts for help with Theorem 2.
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© 1985 George R. Feiwel
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Wilson, R. (1985). Efficient Trading. In: Feiwel, G.R. (eds) Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-06876-0_4
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