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Abstract

In ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ Quine is concerned to combat what he calls ‘dogmas of empiricism’. The first of these is the belief that there is ‘some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truths which are synthetic or grounded in fact’. The second is ‘the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience’ (p. 20). He calls this latter the dogma of reductionism.

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© 1984 İlham Dilman

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Dilman, İ. (1984). Are there Logical Truths?. In: Quine on Ontology, Necessity and Experience. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-06821-0_5

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