On sentient automata theory

  • Jeff Coulter


A unifying metaphysical theme underlying various forms of cognitive theorising is the conception of human agents as sentient automata. Persons are conceived of as complex mechanisms (or sets of inter-related mechanisms) each of which has some deterministic function pertaining to any form of human conduct. Neurophysiological events and processes (albeit under ‘mentalistic’ descriptions) are theoretically invokable in accounting not only for involuntary bodily movements but for the entire gamut of activities involving the human agent. The study of human beings under the auspices of such a conception may be termed sentient automata theory construction.


Active Power Mechanistic Explanation Quantum Phenomenon Neural Event Causal Determinism 
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Copyright information

© Jeff Coulter 1983

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jeff Coulter
    • 1
  1. 1.Graduate School of Arts and SciencesBoston UniversityUSA

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