Contingencies of Conflict

  • James Cable


If the importance of sea-power depends on the nature of the conflict, it goes without saying that the identity of the participants is also significant. An import-dependent island-state is more likely to be involved in the kind of conflict in which sea-power matters than is a land-locked country enjoying a high degree of self-sufficiency. But this book is about Britain and this chapter is uniquely concerned with the kind of conflict in which Britain might be involved. When these contingencies are later examined in more detail, there will be opportunity enough to emphasise the specifically maritime aspects of British national interests. For the moment these can be taken for granted: they are familiar. Nor will this chapter scrutinise the oceans for future sources of conflict. There is already enough trouble to be getting on with. Instead, a series of predicaments will be briefly examined. In each case the purpose will be to identify, for later analysis, any significant contribution which might be expected from British sea-power. Where none can be found, then the hypothetical situation in question, however important, lies outside the scope of this book.


Nuclear Weapon British Isle Nuclear Force Nuclear Exchange Soviet Leader 
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© James Cable 1983

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  • James Cable

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