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Abstract

This paper will begin with a theoretical discussion of the likely effects of super-power guarantees, based on the rather extreme assumption that they are perfectly credible. This proposition will be qualified by a consideration of why, and of the extent to which, in the real world such guarantees are likely to deviate from the perfect model. The effects of such deviations on the super-powers’ ability to attain regional stability through external guarantees will then be discussed.

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Notes

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© 1982 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

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Feldman, S. (1982). Super-Power Security Guarantees in the 1980s. In: Bertram, C. (eds) Third-World Conflict and International Security. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-06312-3_10

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