Abstract
Research on the subject of surprise has thus far been limited to its use in war. Current literature on military surprise thoroughly explores topics such as the optimal use of surprise in tactical and strategic planning; methods of anticipating surprise; and the frequent occurrence of intelligence failures despite strong evidence of an imminent attack. The development of the theory of military surprise has, however, reached the point of diminishing returns.1 At this stage, the study of surprise should expand in new directions.
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Handel, Michael I., Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War, Jerusalem; The Leonard Davis Institute at the Hebrew University; Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems (1976); or an abbreviated version in ‘The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3 (September 1977), pp. 461–503;
or Betts, Richard K., ‘Analysis, War and Decision; Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable’, World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 1 (October 1978), pp. 61–89.
Technological surprise, especially as it occurs in war, is an area of great potential interest. At present, no theoretical study on technological surprise is published. However, Dr Zeev Bonen, the former head of the Israeli Armament and Development Authority, has made some interesting observations on this subject (Technological Surprise mimeo). He suggests that a technological surprise ‘out of the blue’ is rare if not impossible. ‘If the equipment is produced in small quantities, as, for example, in the U-2 case or the A bomb (or Enigma) in World War II, it may be kept secret for a long time’ (p. 5). Even in the cases he cites, technological surprise was avoidable. His research points to a dynamic of failure similar to that in military and diplomatic surprise. The weakest link, according to Bonen, is not in the intelligence acquisition or analysis process as much as in the lack of acceptance of intelligence reports by decisionmakers. For example, he examines one of the classical case studies of technological surprise — that of the launching of the first Russian Sputnik — and draws the following conclusions. The launching of the Sputnik came as a major surprise and shock to the American public abruptly challenging American supremacy. Was the Sputnik a technological intelligence surprise? Definitely not. The information was given directly and clearly by the Russians themselves on various occasions before the actual launching (October 4, 1957). … Obviously there was no intelligence surprise. The information was freely available. It was a problem of acceptance. The Americans did not take the Russian challenge seriously. Their strong belief in American technological supremacy was a very effective filter that discounted and rejected the possibility of being overtaken by the Russians in the satellite race (pp. 8–9). See also, Krieger, F. J., Behind the Sputniks (Washington, DC. Public Affairs Press, 1958);
and York, Herbert F., Race to Oblivion, (New York, Simon and Schuster 1971), pp. 106–125. Another area of interest in the general study of surprise is that of disasters as surprise.
See Turner, Barry A., ‘The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters’, Administrative Science Quarterly (September 1976), Vol 21, pp. 378–397.
See also, Turner, Barry A., ‘Research Note: A Comment on the Nature of Information in Channels of Observation’, Cybernetica, Vol. 20, No. 1(1977). pp. 39–42.
Liska, George, Beyond Kissinger: Ways of Conservative Statecraft (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 25.
For the characteristics of the balance of power system see Gulick, Edward Vose, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (New York. W.W. Norton 1967);
Kaplan, Morton A., System and Process in International Politics (New York, Wiley and Sons, 1967), part 1;
Butterfield, ‘The Balance of Power’ in Butterfield, Herbert and Wight, Martin (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 132–148, 149–175;
Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 167–224;
Haas, Ernst B., ‘The Balance of Power — Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda’, World Politics Vol. 5 (July 1953), pp. 442–477; Hoffman, Stanley, ‘Balance of Power’, The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (old) Vol. II, pp. 395–399;
Kim, Kyung-Won, Revolution and International System (New York, New York University Press. 1970).
For the multipolar system, see Aron, Raymond, Peace and War, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1966), pp. 94–149;
and Hoffman, Stanley, Gulliver’s Troubles (New York, McGraw Hill, 1968), pp. 3–52. (The term multipolar is actually inexact since by definition there can be only two poles.)
Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War (New York, Atheneum 1968), p. 229.
The fact that major diplomatic surprises do occur is, of course, an excellent critique of the theories of realpolitik from a psychological point of view. Despite the logic of realpolitik, perceptions of decision makers and intelligence analysts continue to interfere with what logic ought to tell them. See, for example, Friedländer, ‘Forecasting in International Relations’, Futuribiles (Geneva, Librarie Droz, 1965);
Knorr, Klaus and Morgenstern, Oskar, Political Conjecture in Military (Princeton, NJ, Princeton Center of International Studies (November 1968), Policy Memorandum No. 35.
For the story of the Israeli — Egyptian early contacts, see Zion, Sidney and Dan, Uri, ‘Untold Story of the Mideast Talks’, pp. 20–22, 46–53; and New York Times Magazine (28 January 1979), pp. 32–38, 42–43; and Time (14 August 1978), pp. 17–18.
See also, el Sadat, Anwar, In Search of Identity (New York, Harper and Row, 1978), p. 306; Golan, Tamar, ‘Meetings in Morocco’, Maariv Weekend Magazine, pp. 7–9;
Porat, Y., ‘Dayan’s Fingerprints’, Yediot Aharnot (5 May 1978), p. 3.
Nixon, Richard M., The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York, Crosset and Dunlap, 1978).
It is interesting to speculate whether there is a certain personality type of political leader who is more inclined to use surprise as a political tool against friends and enemies alike, in domestic as well as in foreign policy. Do Stalin, Hitler, Khruschev, de Gaulle, or Sadat have any personality traits in common, or did they operate in a similar political environment or political system? Hitler and Sadat used surprise tactics frequently in both domestic and foreign politics. A highly authoritarian type of leader, who is the only major decisionmaker in his country, can more easily resort to the use of surprise. He does not have to consult others, so it is not difficult to maintain secrecy. A democratic type of leader who functions in a democratic political environment will find it more difficult to maintain secrecy and resort to abrupt policy changes. Authoritarian leaders do not necessarily act creatively or on intuition only when they decide to change the course of their policy. They try, however, to reach such decisions without consultation or teamwork. They make swift decisions against little or no opposition, and do not hesitate to get rid of those who may object to their new policies (Stalin’s dismissal of Litvinov, or Sadat’s firing of two foreign ministers, for instance). The leader in a democratic system usually has to consider public opinion, interest groups, political allies and opponents, etc. It is not only an authoritarian leader, but also a non-democratic or closed political system that is more conducive to political surprise. It is, as a matter of fact, difficult to separate the two. But authoritarian leaders can rise to power in democratic systems. President de Gaulle was a leader with little tolerance of opposition. He ruled in a non-democratic fashion and imposed his opinion and discipline on his cabinet. He certainly chose the astonishing and unexpected, and did not hesitate to break away from longstanding policies. Surprise can thus be seen as a characteristic of a certain political style; hence, it is typical of Hitler and Sadat who have raised it to the level of an intuitive political act. Sadat made his decision to come to Jerusalem on his peace initiative as best as is known, completely on his own, a personal decision not based on advisors, aids, or any staff work. No wonder he has also surprised in his decision even those who are the closest to him … and so, in a dramatic move, in a ‘typical Sadat surprise’, he chose the course of making peace (Major-General Gazit, ‘The Israeli —Arab Conflict After the Camp David Agreements’, mimeo (no date), p. 5. See also Heikal’s testimony on Sadat’s surprise decision to expel the Soviet experts from Egypt in July 1972: Heikal, Mohamed, The Sphinx and the Commissar (New York, Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 242–244.
Allison, Graham, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, Little Brown, 1971).
Aster, Sidney, 1939: The Making of the Second World War (New York, Simon and Schuster 1973), p. 318.
Kalb, Marvin and Kalb, Bernard, Kissinger (Boston, Little, Brown, 1974), p. 298.
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© 1981 Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr and Uri Ra’anan
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Handel, M.I. (1981). Surprise in Diplomacy. In: Pfaltzgraff, R.L., Ra’anan, U., Milberg, W. (eds) Intelligence Policy and National Security. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-05828-0_16
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