The Adequacy of SALT Verification



Let me start with some lessons from SALT I that have been important in framing SALT II and will be important in the ratification debate. One such lesson is that unilateral statements may be worth the paper they are written on, but no more. A unilateral statement by the United States that clarifies something they intend to do may be helpful, but we cannot expect our unilateral statements to impose constraints on the Soviet Union. If the Soviet leaders refuse to agree to accept a particular constraint, they probably have some reason for doing so. Our making a statement that says, in effect, ‘We wish you would have agreed to such and such a provision’, cannot substitute for Soviet acceptance of the provision.


National Security Verification Problem Unilateral Statement Soviet Leader Control Agreement 
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© Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr and Uri Ra’anan 1981

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