Abstract
For the Federal Republic of Germany the importance of East-West economic relations goes far beyond the 6 per cent share in its foreign trade. Like, for example, Austria, the Federal Republic regards this trade as a product of its historical ties with East European countries, justified and favoured by its geographical location between West and East Europe. In 1932 German-Soviet trade, for example, reached one third of the Soviet Union’s trade volume (1). Close relations also prevailed in the field of cooperation. In the second half of the 1920s, the Soviet Union concluded 40 per cent of its agreements on technical aid and 32 per cent of its licensing agreements with Germany (2). Trade relations between other East European countries and Germany were of similar orders of magnitude. World War I l and its aftermath led to the development in Europe of two integration areas with different economic systems and relatively minor economic interrelations. That affected, in particular, trade between Germany and the East European countries. The development of economic relations in the 1960s, however, was instrumental in suppressing the antagonistic elements in East-West relations just as, in the reverse sense, the détente policy of the early 1970s favoured the dynamic development of economic relations. Today the Federal Republic of Germany is the most important Western trading partner of all CMEA member states. Likewise, for the Federal Republic, East-West relations are a vital economic and political factor, which it tries to incorporate into the network of its economic and political foreign relations.
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen near München, FRG
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References
Cf. Werner Beitel, Jürgen Nötzold, Deutsch-sowjetische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in der Zeit der Weimarer Republik (German-Soviet economic relations during the Weimar Republic), SWP-S 248, Ebenhausen near Munich, 1978 (and Baden-Baden 1979 ), p. 191.
Ibid., p. 211 and 217.
According to studies by Tate and Raschom the oil price increases of 1973/74 restricted the U.S. growth potential, for example, by about 40 %; cf. Robert H. Raschom, John A. Tate, “Energy Resources and Potential GNP” in Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Vol. 59, No. 6, June 1977, p. 10–23.
Cf. Achim v. Heynitz, “Die energiepolitischen Beziehungen zwischen Europa und den USA, Akzentverschiebungen im Gefolge der Erdölkrise” in: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (ed.): Polarität und Interdependenz ( Energy Relations between Europe and the U.S.A.; Shifts of Emphasis in the Wake of the Oil Crisis) Baden-Baden 1978, p. 134.
First Resolution and first Report of the Economic Committee: Second Extension of the Energy Program of the Federal Government, Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 8/2370 of December 1978, p. 12.
Ibid., p. 13.
In 1970, 4.2 % and in 1976 5.8 % of West Europe’s oil consumption was covered by Soviet deliveries. For the Federal Republic, the comparative figures are 3.2 % and 4.7 % respectively. Source: World Energy Supplies, various issues. (Soviet revenues from energy exports to the West in 1977 amounted to $ 6.8 billion, those of CMEA to about $ 8 billion. That means that the Soviet Union netted 56 % and CMEA approx. 35 % of their hard currencies from energy exports.)
In natural gas, the USSR supplied 1.2 % in 1970 (FRG 0) and 5.9 % (FRG 8.2 %) of West European consumption in 1976.
Western Europe covered 8 per cent of its coal consumption in 1976 by CMEA supplies as compared to 6.3 per cent in 1970 (the corresponding FRG figure is 2.4 per cent in each year).
f one takes the investment costs for the production of Alaska oil ($ 5 200 per b/d) as guide, additional oil fields, for example in the Barents Sea, could be exploited with the aid of Western technology with the effect that the costs would be amortized within a few years by oil sales. Major projects for an increase of oil supply could also be realized in terms of coal production and its liquefaction or gasification with Western capital.
In 1976, CMEA energy consumption, at 5,251 tce was 8 per cent above EEC consumption (4,882 tce). In the CSSR energy consumption was 25 per cent and in the GDR 15 per cent above consumption in the Federal Republic. Source: World Energy Supplies 1972–1976, New York 1978.
Second Extension of the Energy Program of the Federal Government, Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 8/2370 of 8 December 1978, p. 13.
The Soviet Union, which is the richest gas region of the world, holds 37 per cent of proved and 26 per cent of possible world resources, while the West European supplies are on the decline (7 percent of proved and 4 per cent of possible resources). Therefore the Federal Republic of Germany, in view of a predicted 50 per cent consumption growth to 90 million tce between 1978 and 1990, will have to raise its i its from 37 to 68 million tce and its imports from areas outside Western Europe from 9 to lion tce. For production and regional reasons the Soviet Union appears to be well suited as a source for these additional natural gas imports. Source: Ruhrgas AG (ed.), Erdgas auf dem Weg ins nächste Jahrhundert ( Natural Gas on the road into the next century ), Essen 1979.
Cf. lecture by Kazimierz Kopecki at the German-Polish Forum on 17 October 1978 in Olsztyn.
Günther van Well, Belgrad 1977, “Das KSZE-Folgetreffen und seine Bedeutung für den EntspannungsprozeR”. (Belgrade 1977, The CSCE Follow-up Meeting and its significance for the detente process). Europa Archiv, No. 18, 1977, p. 577 (translation by authors).
Helmut Schmidt, The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, Survival No. 1, 1978, p. 8.
Final Act of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. International Legal Materials, September 1975, S. 1302, 1304.
Cf. Speech by Prime Minister Kossigyn at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, Pravda, 7 April 1971.
Cf. Peter R. Odell, K.E. Rosing, Optimal Development of the North Sea’s Oil Fields, A Study in Divergent Government and Company Interests and their Reconciliation, London 1976; and C.G. Wall, D.C. Wilson, W. Jones, “Optimal Development of the North Sea’s Oil Fields — the Criticism”, in Energy Policy, December 1977, p. 284–294.
Cf. Roy Dafter “La Politique énergétique de la Grande Bretagne” in Revue l’Énergie, 29me Année, No. 302, Mars 1978, p. 132.
Second Extension of the Energy Program of the Federal Government, Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 1357, 19 December 1977, p. 2.
Cf. Alec Nove “What are the Russians Trying to Hide” The Times, 18 August 1978, p. 17.
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© 1980 The Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies
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Heynitz, A., Müller, F. (1980). The Interests of the Federal Republic of Germany in East-West Cooperation in Energy: Conditions and Chances for Realization. In: Saunders, C.T. (eds) East and West in the Energy Squeeze. Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-05758-0_19
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