Abstract
The so-called New Welfare Economics sprang from the desire to allow the economist to make policy recommendations without committing him to interpersonal comparisons of satisfactions. It attempted to do this by announcing an unambiguous criterion for an increase in social income or an improvement in welfare, which was believed to be free of the taint of interpersonal comparisons.
From: Probleme der normativen ökonomik and der wirtschaftspolitischen Beratung, ed. von Beckerath and Giersch, Berlin (1963).
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Notes
P. A. Samuelson in his review of Graaff’s Theoretical Welfare Economics, Economic Journal (September 1958), p. 540.
J. R. Hicks, “The Rehabilitation of Consumer’s Surplus”, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 8 (1940–2), p. 111.
T. Scitovsky, “A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics”, Review of Economic Studies (1940–1), p. 108.
P. A. Samuelson, “Evaluation of Real National Income”, Oxford Economic Papers (January 1950) and Foundations, Ch. 8. J. de V. Graaff, Theoretical Weare Economics (1957).
D. H. Robertson, “Utility and all that”, Manchester School (May 1951), p. 134, reprinted in Utility and All That (1952).
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© 1981 Paul Streeten
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Streeten, P. (1981). Values, Facts and the Compensation Principle. In: Development Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-05341-4_2
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