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Paralipomena

  • Hugo A. Meynell
Part of the New Studies in the Philosophy of Religion book series (NSPR)

Abstract

Having set out a form of cosmological argument for the existence of God, I shall consider briefly in the light of it the objections to arguments of this type listed in the second chapter.

Keywords

Brute Fact Prima Facie Case Explanatory Question Theistic Belief Ultimate Explanation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 7.
    Cf. A. Kenny, The God of the Philosophers (Oxford, 1979) 127: ‘I know of no successful treatment of the philosophical problems involved in conceiving a non-embodied mind active throughout the universe.’ Briefly, if there is any being that conceives and wills the universe as a whole, it cannot be a body, since nothing could be a body and not a part of the universe thus conceived and willed.Google Scholar
  2. 12.
    W. L. Craig, The Kalām Cosmological Argument (London, 1979).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 20.
    On evidence supporting the ‘big bang’ theory of the origin of the universe, see Craig, Kalām Cosmological Argument, 111–16. See also S. Weinberg, The First Three Minutes. A Modern View of the Origin of the Universe (London, 1977).Google Scholar
  4. On the last point, cf. Craig, ibid, 122; citing J. Gribbin, ‘Oscillating Universe Bounces Back’, Nature, 259 (1976) 15.Google Scholar
  5. 26.
    R. Gruner, ‘Science, Nature and Christianity’ The Journal of Theological Studies (April 1975).Google Scholar
  6. 31.
    For a convenient summary of the aspects of Aristotelianism objected to by Bacon, see R. Attfield, God and the Secular (Cardiff, 1978) 20–3.Google Scholar
  7. 35.
    For a survey of later ‘Aristotelian’ positions, see P. D. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought (New York, 1961) ch. 2.Google Scholar
  8. 36.
    P. 27 above. Aristotle’s distinction between two fundamental types of question is preserved in the distinction, familiar to theorists of scientific method, between the concocting and testing of scientific hypotheses. ‘In his endeavour to find a solution to his problem, the scientist may give free rein to his imagination, and the course of his creative thinking may be influenced even by scientifically questionable notions … Yet, scientific objectivity is safeguarded by the principle that while hypotheses and theories may be freely invented and proposed in science, they can be acceptedinto the body of scientific knowledge only if they pass critical scrutiny, which includes in particular the checking of suitable test implications by careful observation or experiment’ (C. G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1966) 16).Google Scholar
  9. 37.
    Michael B. Foster, ‘The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modern Natural Science’, reprinted in C. A. Russell (ed.), Science and Religious Belief (London, 1973) 311ff.Google Scholar
  10. 40.
    The difficulty may be resolved, in principle, if one regards the Bible as on the whole conveying in dramatic and pictorial terms the same truths as are more literally and technically expressed in the dogmas of the Church. For this view of the matter, cf. J. H. Newman, An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine(London, 1890) 190; and B. J. F. Lonergan, Insight, 739–40; and Method in Theology, 306–12, 319.Google Scholar
  11. 42.
    R. Taylor, Metaphysics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963) 87–9.Google Scholar
  12. 43.
    P. T. Geach and G. E. M. Anscombe, Three Philosophers(Oxford, 1961) 112–13.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Hugo A. Meynell 1982

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hugo A. Meynell
    • 1
  1. 1.Departments of Philosophy and of Theology and Religious StudiesUniversity of LeedsUK

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