Abstract
The critical attacks of Hume and Kant mark a watershed in the history of the cosmological argument. Leibniz and Wolff were probably the last significant philosophers who felt it sufficient simply to present the argument in a brief form, confident that it needed no further underpinning. Hume and Kant ushered in what might be called the modern era of the cosmological argument; things could never be quite the same after their sceptical critique: Arthur Schopenhauer noted that Kant had dealt a ‘death blow’ to the cosmological argument and that by the time of his own writing, theistic proofs had ‘lost all credit’.1 Modern defenders of the argument have felt obliged to expound the proof at greater length, defending it against the combined criticisms of the two English and German philosophers. It seems natural, then, to halt at this juncture and survey the ground over which we have travelled without moving into contemporary discussions of the cosmological argument. I propose in this brief chapter to develop a typology of cosmological arguments which, I hope, may serve contemporary philosophers as a guide in discussion of the argument.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason’, in Two Essays by Arthur Schopenhauer (London: George Bell & Sons, 1889), pp. 42, 146. It is gratifying to find that R. L. Sturch in his survey of the cosmological argument comes to virtually the same threefold typology as I do: the Kalam argument, the causal argument, and the contingency argument (R. L. Sturch, ‘The Cosmological Argument’ [Ph.D thesis, Oxford University, 1972]).
William L. Rowe, The Cosmological Argument (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 3–4, 6–9.
John Herman Randall, Aristotle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 135.
Fazlur Rahman, ‘Ibn Sina’, in A History of Muslim Philosophy ed. M. M. Sharif (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), p. 482.
Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas [Le thomisme], trans. Edward Bullough (Cambridge: W. Helfer & Sons, 1924), p. 57;
Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London: Sheed & Ward, 1955), p. 370;
Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. L. K. Shook (London: Victor Gollancz, 1961), p. 64.
R. Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence and Nature, 5th ed., 2 vols., trans. Bede Rose (London and St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1934), 1: 181–91, 261–302.
Efrem Bettoni, Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of His Philosophy, trans. and ed. Bernardine Bonansea (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1961), p. 137.
G. H. R. Parkinson, Logic and Reality in Leibniz’s Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 95.
For this view, see Bruce Reichenbach, The Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1972), pp. 53–6.
E. L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1943), pp. 73–4;
E. L. Mascall, The Openness of Being (London: Darton, Longman, & Todd, 1971), pp. 101–2, 117.
George A. Blair, ‘Another Look at St. Thomas’ “First Way”’, International Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1976): 307.
Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian ‘Metaphysics’ 2nd ed. (Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963), pp. 172, 174.
Julius R. Weinberg, A Short History of Medieval Philosophy (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 189.
Felix Alluntio, ‘Demonstrability and Demonstration of the Existence of God’, in Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, vol. 3: John Duns Scotus,1265–1965, ed. John K. Ryan and Bernardine M. Bonansea (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1965), p. 155.
John Edwin Gurr, The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Some Scholastic Systems, 1750–1900 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1959), pp. 15, 48–9.
Dennis Bonnette, Aquinas’ Proofs for God’s Existence (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), p. 125.
Comments Rowe, ‘....if the Principle of Sufficient Reason were shown to be false, we could, then, fairly say that the Cosmological Argument had been refuted’ (William L. Rowe, ‘The Cosmological Argument and the Principle of sufficient Reason’, Man and World 2 [1968]: 279).
Antony Flew, God and Philosophy (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1966), p. 83.
D. J. B. Hawkins, The Essentials of Theism (London and New York: Sheed & Ward, 1949), p. 41.
A. J. Wensinck, ‘Les preuves de l’existence de Dieu dans la théologie musulmane’, Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Academie van Wetenschappen 81 (1936): 47–8.
C. D. Broad, Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953), p. 186;
Paul Edwards, ‘The Cosmological Argument’, in The Cosmological Arguments, ed. W. R. Burrill (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co.; Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 101–23;
Wallace I. Matson, The Existence of God (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965), pp.76–7;
John Hick, Arguments for the Existence of God (New York: Herder & Herder, 1971), pp. 50–3;
John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 443.
Contra see Rem B. Edwards, Reason and Religion (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch, 1972), p. 150;
Donald R. Kehew, ‘A Metaphysical Approach to the Existence of God’ Franciscan Studies 32 (1972): 113–14;
John J. Shepherd, Experience, Inference and God (London: Macmillan Press, 1975), pp. 76–8.
Bertrand Russell and F. C. Copleston, ‘The Existence of God’, in The Existence of God, ed. with an Introduction by John Hick, Problems of Philosophy Series (New York: Macmillan Co., 1964), pp. 174, 176;
Matson, Existence pp. 82–3; Flew, God p. 83; D. R. Duff-Forbes, ‘Hick, Necessary Being, and the Cosmological Argument’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy I (1972): 473–83; Hospers, Introduction p. 442. Contra see Hick, Arguments pp. 48–50;
John Hick, ‘Comment’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1972): 485–7.
Robert Merrihew Adams, ‘Has it been Proved that all Real Existence is Contingent?’, American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971): 284–91.
On factual necessity, see R. L. Franklin, ‘Necessary Being’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1957): 97–100;
John Hick, ‘God as Necessary Being’, Journal of Philosophy 57 (1960) 733–4;
John H. Hick, ‘Necessary Being’, Scottish Journal of Theology 14 (1961): 353–69;
Bruce R. Reichenbach, ‘Divine Necessity and the Cosmological Argument’, Monist 54 (1970): 401–15.
For an attempt to reduce factual necessity to logical necessity by means of reasoning remarkably similar to Scotus’s ontological argument, see Adel Daher, ‘God and Factual Necessity’, Religious Studies 6 (1970): 28–30.
David Hume, Hume’s ‘Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion’, ed. with an Introduction by Norman Kemp Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), pp. 233–4;
Stuart C. Hackett, The Resurrection of Theism (Chicago: Moody Press, 1957), pp. 196–7, 221–9;
Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, Foundations of Philosophy Series (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 90–3;
Ninian Smart, Philosophers and Religious Truth (London: SCM Press, 1964), pp. 101–7;
Fernand Van Steenberghen, Hidden God, trans. T. Crowley (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1966; St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1966), pp. 174–5;
Hick, Arguments, pp. 48–50; John Hick, ‘Brand Blanshard’s “Reason and Belief”’, Journal of Religion 56 (1976): 403.
Bruce Reichenbach, The Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1972), pp. 1–22;
Leonard J. Eslick, ‘The Real Distinction: Reply to Professor Reese’, Modern Schoolman 38 (1961): 149–60;
George P. Klubertanz and Maurice Halloway, Being and God (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963).
For an extensive bibliography on essentialism see Nicholas Rescher, A Theory of Possibility (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975), pp. 223–47.
R. Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence and Nature, 2 vols., 5th ed., trans. B. Rose (London and St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1934), 1: 265;
R. P. Phillips, Modern Thomistic Philosophy 2 Vols. (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1935), 2: 278. Contra see Edwards, ‘Argument’, pp. 101–23;
Patterson Brown, ‘Infinite Causal Regression’, in Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Anthony Kenny (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 234–5;
Anthony Kenny, The Five Ways: St. Thomas Aquinas’ Proofs of God’s Existence (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), pp. 26–7.
For background on this problem, see Bernard Bolzano, Paradoxes of the Infinite, trans. Fr. Prihonsky with an Introduction by D. A. Steele (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950);
Richard Dedekind, Essays on the Theory of Numbers, trans. W. W. Beman (New York: Dover Publications, 1963);
Georg Cantor, Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers, trans. with an Introduction by P. E. B. Jourdain (New York: Dover Publications, 1915);
Abraham A. Fraenkel, Abstract Set Theory, 2nd rev. ed. (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1961);
Abraham A. Fraenkel, Yehoshua BarHillel, and Azriel Levy, Foundations of Set Theory, 2nd rev. ed. (Amsterdam and London: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1973);
David Hilbert, ‘On the Infinite’, in Philosophy of Mathematics, ed. with an Introduction by P. Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 151.
Hackett, Theism pp. 194–5, 294; G. J. Whitrow, The Natural Philosophy of Time (London and Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1961; rev. ed. forthcoming), pp. 31–2;
G. J. Whitrow, ‘The Impossibility of an Infinite Past’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (1978) 39–45;
Pamela M. Huby, ‘Kant or Cantor? That the Universe, if Real, Must be Finite in Both Space and Time’, Philosophy 46 (1971); 121–3;
Pamela M. Huby, ‘Cosmology and Infinity’, Philosophy 48 (1973): 186.
Contra see Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ (London: Macmillan & Co., 1918), pp. 483–4;
Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1929), pp. 170–1, 195;
Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, 2nd ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1937), p. 459;
G. E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, Muirhead Library of Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953; New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 180;
C. D. Broad, ‘Kant’s Mathematical Antinomies’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 40 (1955): 3;
R. G. Swinburne, Space and Time (London: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 298–9;
W. H. Newton-Smith, ‘Armchair Cosmology’, Philosophy 47 (1972): 64–5;
N. W. Boyce ‘A Priori Knowledge and Cosmology’, Philosophy 47 (1972): 67;
P. J. Zwart, About Time (Amsterdam and Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 238, 242–3;
Karl Popper, ‘On the Possibility of an Infinite Past’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (1978): 47–8.
There is also a sizeable body of literature on the Zeno paradoxes that is relevant to this issue. See the Bibliography in Wesley C. Salmon, ed., Zeno’s Paradoxes (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970).
Copyright information
© 1980 William Lane Craig
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Craig, W.L. (1980). A Typology of Cosmological Arguments. In: The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz. Library of Philosophy and Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04993-6_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04993-6_9
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-04995-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-04993-6
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)