The Commonwealth and the Economic Crisis 1931–1939

Abstract

The economic and political crisis of the early 1930s effectively destroyed the internationalist consensus which had helped stabilise European affairs since the war. ‘For the first time since the peace’, Robert Vansittart noted in 1931 looking back on the preceding twelve months, ‘people talked of war, foolishly no doubt, as a thing no longer unbelievable. It became once again a possibility in the mind of man.’¹ And because British diplomacy and prestige had been so clearly identified with the League’s success it was inevitable that, in particular, doubts should now be felt as to the UK’s capacity to maintain the Versailles system. The moral legitimacy of British power which for Austen Chamberlain had been symbolised by the achievement of Locarno was being destroyed, Vansittart remarked, by the idle chatter of British decline around the cafe tables of Paris, Berlin and Geneva.² In Whitehall, too, considerable effort went into analysing Britain’s failure to keep a European concert in being. Social division at home, the sustained depression in the traditional export industries and the continuance of tense Anglo-American relations preventing cooperation among the Anglo-Saxon powers were all prominent as explanations. In January 1932, however, Vansittart added one further factor

One reason for our loss of weight since 1926 has been that the ‘foreigner’ — we must be insular for a minute — has been secretly anticipating the gradual dissolution of the Empire, and some of the Commonwealth delegations have not at times exactly discouraged the idea. It is therefore essential that this hand should be played with the greatest possible measure of unity among the Commonwealth representatives … it is impossible to separate ourselves from, or to go against, the Dominions at this crisis…³