Abstract

This chapter analyses the methods of wage control used in the Soviet bloc countries. As already mentioned in the introduction, this analysis is on a general level and comparative in nature. It is for the most part a systematisation of the methods applied or, in other words, a discussion of models of wage regulation as they exist nowadays. The analysis of the actual application of these models in individual countries is left to Part Three. (See also Appendixes 1 and 2.)

Keywords

Income Expense Plague Compro 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. 2.
    S. Shkurko, Sotsialisticheskii trud, no. 1, 1975.Google Scholar
  2. 5.
    In the USSR the last adjustment of wage rates was in 1969–75 and before that in 1956–65 (1956–60 in productive and 1964–5 in non-productive industries). See B. M. Sucharevskii, in Trud i zarabotnaia plata v SSSR, 1975, p. 249. In Czechoslovakia the last adjustment was in 1973, and before that in 1958–60; in Poland in 1972–6, before that in 1960; in Hungary in 1976, and before that in 1971; the GDR is now engaged in adjustment and was before in 1958–60. SeeGoogle Scholar
  3. B. Sucharevskii, Sotsialisticheskii trud, no. 4, 1974.Google Scholar
  4. 8.
    E. I. Kapustin, in Trud i zarabotnaia plata v SSSR, 1975, pp. 280–1; Supplement to Hospodářské noviny, no. 4, 1974; andGoogle Scholar
  5. B. Sucharevskii, Sotsialisticheskii trud, no. 4, 1974.Google Scholar
  6. 15.
    The increase should be differentiated; wage rates of sub-groups marked with higher skills and more difficult working conditions should increase by a greater rate, whereas the range within the sub-group should be narrowed. See A. Szávai, Munkaügyi Szemle, no. 1, 1977, and Munka, no. 2, 1977, and no. 1, 1978.Google Scholar
  7. 18.
    What happened in Poland in the 1960s is a good example. See B. Fick, Zycie gospodarcze, no. 1, 1964. T. Kierczynski and U. Wojciechowska, (1972, pp. 126–7) drew the following conclusion from the Polish example. ‘The direct limitation of the wage-bill (from the centre) led to a concealment of reserves in labour productivity in the economy and also to lack of enterprises’ interest in a rational economising on labour force.’Google Scholar
  8. 21.
    A case in point was the Hungarian experience of 1968–70. One of the reasons for resorting to average wage regulation in 1968 was the fear that wage-bill regulation would lead to unemployment. (See J. Lökkȯs, Közgazdasági Szemle, no. 2, 1976.) In fact, just the opposite happened. For more, see Chapter 9.Google Scholar
  9. 23.
    J. Wilczek, Közgazdasági Szemle, no. 1, 1972.Google Scholar
  10. 27.
    J. Lökkös, Közgazdasági Szemle, no. 2, 1978.Google Scholar
  11. 31.
    In the recently reformed Polish system, though planning has become more flexible and less directive, binding targets from the centre are retained. Apart from the mandatory normatives connected with wage regulations and incentives, the appropriate minister is authorized to assign enterprises the following targets inter alia: value of the shipments of goods for the market, introduction of new products, value of exports and imports broken down according to geographical areas and size of investment credits. See J. Marzec in Nowy system ekonomiczno finansowy w organizacjach przemyslowych, 1974, p. 79; andGoogle Scholar
  12. J. Olszewski, Nowe drogi, no. 4, 1974.Google Scholar
  13. 37.
    A. Topiński, in Zarys systému funkcjowania przemyshwych jednostek inicjua̧cych, 1975, p. 149.Google Scholar
  14. 47.
    L. Zsóka, Munkaügyi Szemle, no. 11, 1976.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Jan Adam 1979

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jan Adam

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations