Abstract
In a number of passages to be found across his writings, Ayer has turned his attention to a claim which consistently found favour within that philosophical tradition to which he has always, and justly, seen himself as standing in natural succession. The tradition is, of course, that of classical British empiricism, and the claim is the claim that memory (or some particular type of memory) provides an adequate criterion of personal identity.
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Notes
A. J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge ( London: Macmillan, 1940 ) pp. 142–4
A. J. Ayer: The Problem of Knowledge (London: Penguin, 1956) pp. 222–3; The Origins of Pragmatism (London: Macmillan, 1968) p. 297; The Concept of a Person ( London: Macmillan, 1963) pp. 114–15.
Bernard Williams, ‘Personal Identity and Individuation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LVII (1956–7) 229–52; repr. in his Problems of the Self(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973 ).
For example, Anthony Flew, ‘Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity’, Philosophy XXVI (1951) 53–68.
Richard Wollheim: ‘Imagination and Identification’, in his On Art and the Mind (London, 1973) pp. 54–83; and ‘Identification and Imagination: the Inner Structure of a Psychic Mechanism’, in Freud: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. R. Wollheim ( Anchor Books, New York, 1974 ) pp. 172–95.
For example, Derek Parfit, ‘Personal Identity’, Philosophical Review, LXXX (1971) 3–27; repr. in Personal Identity, ed. John Perry ( Berkeley and Los Angeles, Cal., 1975 ).
Cf. N. J. Block and J. A. Fodor, ‘What Psychological States are Not’, Philosophical Review, LXXXI(1972) 159–81.
Cf. David Wiggins, ‘Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: and Men as a Natural Kind’, Philosophy, LI (1976) 131–58; repr. in a revised form in The Identities of Persons, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty ( Berkeley and Los Angeles, Cal., 1976 ).
Cf. A. N. Prior, ‘Opposite Number’, Review of Metaphysics II (1957) 196–201, and ‘Time Existence and Identity’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society LXVI (1965–6) 183–92.
For example, Saul Kripke, ‘Identity and Necessity’, in Identity and Individuation, ed. Milton K. Munitz ( New York: New York University Press, 1971 ).
For example, Hilary Putnam, ‘Is Semantics Possible?’, in Languages, Belief and Metaphysics, ed. H. Kiefer and M. Munitz (State University of N.Y. Press, Albany, NY, 1970); repr. in his Mind, Language and Reality ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975 ).
Cf. Richard Wollheim, ‘The Mind and the Mind’s Image of Itself’, International Journal of Psycho-Analysis L (1969) 209–20; repr. in his On Art and the Mind.
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© 1979 Graham Macdonald, Michael Dummett, P. F. Strawson, David Pears, D. M. Armstrong, Charles Taylor, J. L. Mackie, David Wiggins, John Foster, Richard Wollheim, Peter Unger, Bernard Williams, Stephan Körner and A. J. Ayer
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Wollheim, R. (1979). Memory, Experiential Memory, and Personal Identity. In: Macdonald, G.F. (eds) Perception and Identity. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04862-5_9
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