The Simonstown Negotiations

Abstract

Since the Simonstown Agreements, which were sealed between Britain and South Africa by an exchange of letters in June 1955 and published on 4 July, were principally concerned with defence arrangements, it has been the assumption of the ‘establishment explanation’¹ that Britain’s strategic interest at the Cape was the major factor in the negotiations which led up to them and in the final shape which they assumed. The further assumption is characteristic of this explanation, as we shall see, that the British government had got the better of the Nationalists in the deal which lay at the heart of these agreements. Was security Britain’s main consideration in these negotiations? Did the balance of advantage in the final agreements in fact favour Britain rather than South Africa? If the establishment explanation is wrong in its answers to both of these questions and if, instead, the Simonstown Agreements signified a qualified diplomatic triumph for the South Africans — as will be argued — is there any evidence to suggest that sentiment or concern for the High Commission Territories prompted British concessions or, rather, that the explanation lies in greater part in the realisation of South Africa’s potential economic power?