The Problem of British Policy

Abstract

It is hardly open to debate that successive British governments have displayed a marked degree of concern for the hopes and fears of South Africans throughout the post-war period, even though the international reputation of the National Party regime meant that this posture involved increasingly serious diplomatic costs for the United Kingdom. Britain’s attitude was evident in the intimate consultations with South Africa which took place within the Commonwealth and especially so in the energetic — if ultimately futile — efforts which Macmillan made to prevent Dr Verwoerd’s government from being forced out in 1961. This friendship was also apparent in the support which Britain gave to South Africa at the United Nations, in the military relationship which Britain extended to South Africa in that country’s only post-war external defence agreement — the Simonstown Agreements of 1955 — and, amongst other things, in a multi-faceted economic relationship which was reinforced by South Africa’s enjoyment of Commonwealth Preference even after the departure of South Africa from the association which appeared to simple eyes to confer this entitlement. Of course, when the Labour Party was in power the long-established policy of creating as much public distance as possible between the United Kingdom and apartheid was given a new edge but, at least before the 1970s, this did not extend to any profound modification of the substance of British concern for South Africa’s vital interests.¹