Knowing as an Act

Abstract

In previous chapters I have considered the attempts of some philosophers to link the notions of knowledge and infallibility by restricting the range of things which can be known to propositions which in no circumstances could be false. Thus we have seen that, on the more rigorous view, the possibility of achieving knowledge is restricted to necessary truths such as are to be found in logic and mathematics. On the less rigorous view, in addition to such necessary truths, some contingent propositions are included, namely those which are deemed to be incorrigible, such as propositions which describe our immediate sensations or feelings. We must now consider attempts to link the notions of knowledge and infallibility by restricting the procedures by means of which knowledge can be acquired to those which are foolproof or self-guaranteeing. Such attempts aim to eliminate the possibility of error by allowing only those procedures to count as ‘ways of knowing’ which are risk-free, as opposed to trying to eliminate error by restricting the things which can be known to propositions which could not be false.