Strategy for an Atomic Stalemate
The Soviet Union broke the United States atomic monopoly with a test in August 1949. A number of years would have to pass before this would turn into an atomic stockpile, but the eventual Soviet accumulation of such a stockpile was virtually inevitable. This development had a paradoxical effect. While it discouraged doctrines based upon atomic weapons as a uniquely American advantage, it also locked the United States into a nuclear strategy.
KeywordsAtomic Weapon Fission Bomb Military Expenditure Ground Force Strategic Bombardment
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- 2.GAC Report of October 30 1949 reprinted in Herbert York, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller and the Superbomb (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976). See also Warner R. Schilling ‘The H-Bomb decision: how to decide without actually choosing’, Political Science Quarterly LxxvI (March 1961).Google Scholar
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