Introduction: The Wartime Relationship

  • John Baylis

Abstract

For most observers the quintessence of the ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the United States is the partnership in arms developed during the Second World War. In terms of the intimacy of personal relationships, the strategic direction of forces, the allocation of war materials, the coordination of communications, and the cooperation between the armed forces and intelligence agencies, most writers agree that the wartime alliance between the two states was not only very close but perhaps unique in the history of war.2 Although the full range and depth of the partnership only developed after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941, the first cautious steps were taken in the late 1930s and continued after war broke out in September 1939 when the United States remained officially neutral.

Keywords

Europe Shipping Uranium Radar Turkey 

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Notes

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Copyright information

© John Baylis 1981

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  • John Baylis

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