Participation and Risk



If an individual participates in the making of some decision, one would expect some cost to be borne because of this. The individual wants to participate so as to attain a position preferred to that in which he does not participate. The position he attains with participation in work decisions may be preferred because the amount of effort consequently devoted, and the level of goods and services he attains, is preferred, or he may like making decisions per se. The case where the decision problem is a certain one, that is where one makes a decision and the consequences are known with certainty, is analysed elsewhere in this book. We are here concerned with the case of uncertain consequences of decisions and the implicit consequences for both parties in a bilateral bargaining situation.


Utility Function Housing Rent Expected Utility Maximisation Wage Contract Tenant Farming 
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© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1977

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