Abstract
We are now in a position to bring together the building blocks developed in the previous chapters. On the demand side, these include the preferences of citizens for public policies as these are related to the incomes of citizens and to the tax-prices that have to be paid for these policies as well as to the costs of using the various instruments of political participation that can lead to the desired supply of public expenditure and taxation policies. On the supply side, there is the degree of competition to which the opposition submits the governing party and the degree of interest which this competition stimulates in citizens as reflected in what they remember of the disparities between the weights attached to their tastes by politicians and the weights they themselves use; there is also the bargaining strengths of politicians and bureaucrats which determine the instruments used by politicians in their efforts to reduce the degree of coercion placed on some citizens and the policies that will be implemented.
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© 1974 Albert Breton
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Breton, A. (1974). The Equilibrium Quantity of Government Policies. In: The Economic Theory of Representative Government. Case Studies in Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-02387-5_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-02387-5_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-02389-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-02387-5
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