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Truth, Belief and Knowledge

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Foundations of Inductive Logic
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Abstract

IN the foregoing chapters the meanings of certain cognitive expressions have been taken for granted. It is perhaps in accord with the spirit of empiricism to begin with rough materials, the general character of which is perceived, and proceed to refined concepts and hypotheses. Furthermore, the definition of a concept can be better understood if we already have illustrations of its application.

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© 1974 Macmillan Publishers Limited

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Harrod, R. (1974). Truth, Belief and Knowledge. In: Foundations of Inductive Logic. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-02327-1_7

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