Abstract
After the nightmare frustration of the Chamberlain period, the actual outbreak of war came as something of a relief. So far as I was concerned, there was no illusion concerning the position of weakness from which we had to operate — although I confess I had no suspicion of the military ineptitude and lack of moral fibre of so many of our French allies. But at least we had at last recognised National Socialism for the evil thing it was, and recognised too that there was no hope of coping with it by a policy of concessions and make-believe. It was quite possible that we might be defeated and that the Gauleiters would arrive in their aeroplanes with their lists of dissident elements to be eliminated. But at least we should have fought when there was a chance of coming through rather than have waited till there was no hope whatever.
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© 1971 Lord Robbins
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Robbins, L. (1971). The Economic Section of the Offices of the War Cabinet. In: Autobiography of an Economist. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01164-3_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01164-3_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-01166-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-01164-3
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