Abstract
In section i above we noted that in an early essay Kant had distinguished between being obliged to do something as a means to something else and being obliged ‘immediately’. In section ii we quoted a passage from the Critique of Pure Reason in which Kant says that moral laws ‘command absolutely (not only hypothetically on the presupposition of other empirical ends)’. In section iii we considered his distinction between acting from inclination or with a view to happiness on the one hand, and acting ‘from duty’ on the other, and we noticed his view that an individual can find out whether he is acting from duty by asking himself: ‘Can I also will that the maxim of my action become a universal law?’ The idea that Kant has been working towards in these passages is that of the Categorical Imperative. He explains it in section ii of the Groundwork and in book i, chapter i of the Critique of Practical Reason.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1970 H. B. Acton
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Acton, H.B. (1970). Hypothetical Imperatives and the Categorical Imperative. In: Kant’s Moral Philosophy. New Studies in Ethics. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00761-5_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00761-5_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-00763-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-00761-5
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)