Abstract
Philosophers who concern themselves with the theory of knowledge are apt to be haunted by an ideal of certainty. Seeking a refuge from Descartes’ malicious demon, they look for a proposition, or class of propositions, of whose truth they can be absolutely sure. They think that once they have found this basis they can go on to justify at least some of their beliefs, but that without it there can be no defence against scepticism. Unless something is certain, we are told nothing can be even probable.
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Notes
Cp. C. Lewy, ‘On the Relation of Some Empirical Propositions to Their Evidence’, Mind, vol. liii (1944), 289,
and ‘Entailment and Empirical Propositions’, Mind, vol. lv (1946), 74;
also A. H. Basson, ‘The Existence of Material Objects’, Mind, vol. lv (1946), 308, and my own paper, ‘Phenomenalism’, pp. 135–137.
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© 1972 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Ayer, A.J. (1972). Basic Propositions. In: Philosophical Essays. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00132-3_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00132-3_5
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