Analytic—Synthetic

Abstract

I. what is ‘analytic’? Kant says¹ ‘In all judgements in which there is a relation between subject and predicate … that relation can be of two kinds. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something contained (though covertly) in the concept A; or B lies outside the sphere of the concept A, though somehow connected with it. In the former case I call the judgement analytical, in the latter synthetical. Analytical judgements (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is conceived through identity, while others in which that connection is conceived without identity, may be called synthetical. The former might be called illustrating, the latter expanding judgements, because in the former nothing is added by the predicate to the concept of the subject, but the concept is only divided into its constituent concepts which were always conceived as existing within it, though confusedly; while the latter add to the concept of the subject a predicate not conceived as existing within it, and not to be extracted from it by any process of mere analysis … It is clear from this that our knowledge is in no way extended by analytical judge-ments, but that all they effect is to put the concepts which we possess into better order and render them more intelligible’.