Abstract
In the last chapter we encountered the Gettier problem that is posed by the Gettier-style cases. This is the problem of how to formulate a theory of knowledge which is ‘Gettier-proof’. We noted that Gettier-style cases essentially trade on the anti-luck intuition that if one has knowledge then one has a true belief that could not have easily been wrong. In light of this fact, one natural thought to have is that rather than fixating on avoiding Gettier-style cases we should instead try to formulate that epistemic condition (or conditions) which appropriately accommodates the anti-luck intuition — i.e., we should try to formulate the anti-luck epistemic condition. After all, if we were able to formulate such a condition, then that would deal with the Gettier problem by default, plus any other cases that trade on the anti-luck intuition. We will call any theory of knowledge that explicitly has as a central component an anti-luck epistemic condition an anti-luck epistemology. That the condition has to be explicitly thought of in this way is important since all theories of knowledge aim to exclude knowledge-undermining epistemic luck, and so all such theories can be thought of as implicitly incorporating an anti-luck epistemic condition. Nevertheless, only some theories explicitly incorporate such a condition, as we will see.
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© 2016 Duncan Pritchard
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Pritchard, D. (2016). Anti-Luck Epistemology. In: Epistemology. Palgrave Philosophy Today. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-52692-2_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-52692-2_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-52691-5
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-52692-2
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