The Architecture of Government

  • The Free Enterprise Group
  • Kwasi Kwarteng
  • Ryan Bourne
  • Jonathan Dupont


The structure of government remains designed for a Victorian empire, centrally controlled by an elite in Whitehall. We should accept that there are limits to what a government can know, or the problems it can solve. Government should focus only on what it can do best. At the present, too many departments lead to bureaucratic sprawl. Technocratic attempts to predict the future or steer the business cycle have proved a failure. Instead, we should run balanced budgets, devolve power to increase experimentation and admit our uncertainty about the future.


Public Sector Monetary Policy Minimum Wage Government Spending Balance Budget 
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Copyright information

© Kwasi Kwarteng, Ryan Bourne, Jonathan Dupont 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • The Free Enterprise Group
    • 1
  • Kwasi Kwarteng
  • Ryan Bourne
    • 2
  • Jonathan Dupont
    • 3
  1. 1.UK
  2. 2.Institute of Economic AffairsUK
  3. 3.Policy ExchangeUK

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