Redressing the Structural Imbalance

  • Edward B. Barbier


The world economy today is facing two major threats: increasing environmental degradation and a growing gap between rich and poor. Drawing on historical and contemporary evidence, this book has argued that these two threats are symptomatic of a growing structural imbalance in all economies, which is how nature is exploited to create wealth, and how this wealth is distributed among the population. The root of this imbalance is that natural capital is underpriced, and hence overly exploited, whereas human capital is insufficient to meet demand, thus encouraging wealth inequality.


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© Edward B. Barbier 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Edward B. Barbier
    • 1
  1. 1.University of WyomingUSA

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