The Origins of Economic Wealth

  • Edward B. Barbier


The purpose of the following chapter is to trace the historical origins of our present-day concept of wealth, by examining how human perceptions of wealth have evolved over previous eras. These changing perceptions are important to understanding our present predicament — which is to “undervalue” the contribution of nature to our economies. This misalignment between our exploitation of nature and the creation of wealth is fundamental to the structural imbalance in modern economies. In subsequent chapters, we explore the causes and consequences of this imbalance.


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Copyright information

© Edward B. Barbier 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Edward B. Barbier
    • 1
  1. 1.University of WyomingUSA

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