The New Wagner Mayoralty and the Shaping of Modern New York
After the 1961 election, Mayor Wagner possessed new charter power and was a Democratic Party mayor free from the influence or control of Tammany or other party organizations because of his decisive victory. Running on his liberal, New Deal policy record, Wagner entered his third term at the height of his powers. While he exercised significant administrative powers with the revised charter, his efforts to organize and discipline the Democratic Party in the city as the new chief were frustrated and less successful. By the end of his third and last term in 1965, most of the characteristics of the modern political system in New York were in place: a strong administrative mayor, a weak party/strong interest group system, and strong programmatic linkages between the mayoralty and the public.
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- 1.Daley became Cook County Democratic Chair in 1953, and won the mayoralty a year later (breaking a campaign promise that he would step down as party chief). Most commentators about Chicago politics note how Daley used both posts in tandem to keep an iron grip on politics in his city. While Daley exercised unparalleled power, the cost, of course, in the view of many was the loss in democratic accountability, as well as democratic input into many decisions. See Adam Cohen and Elizabeth Taylor, American Pharaoh: Mayor Richard Daley—His Battle for Chicago and the Nation (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2000).Google Scholar
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