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Corporate Governance: Towards a New Foundation for both Developed and Transition Economies

  • Steve Letza

Abstract

The current debate on corporate governance has been ‘polarized’ between, on the one hand, the shareholding paradigm and, on the other hand, the stakeholding paradigm. However, underpinning the main theories are hidden paradox assumptions which leads to concerns over the credibility and validity of this dichotomized approach. Both camps of the debate rely on a homeostatic and entitative conception of the corporation and its governance structures. Consequently they suffer from inadequate attention to the underlying philosophical presuppositions in which the static approach is rooted. To avoid the traditional trap in theorizing, an alternative approach, referred to as the processual approach, is proposed for a better understanding of the inherent overflow and heterogeneity of corporate governance practices.

Keywords

Corporate Governance Shareholding Stakeholding Dichotomy Static Approach Representationalism Processual Approach 

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© Steve Letza 2015

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  • Steve Letza

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