Quine and the Aufbau: The Possibility of Objective Knowledge

  • Peter Hylton
Part of the History of Analytic Philosophy book series (History of Analytic Philosophy)

Abstract

From one perspective, Carnap and Quine appear to be rather similar in their preoccupations and their doctrines; seen from another, however, they seem to be diametrically opposed, and on absolutely fundamental issues. The particular point of comparison with which I am concerned here has to do with Carnap’s Aufbau (1928). Quine devotes considerable space to the discussion of that work. A more or less representative passage is as follows:

Russell reflected in 1914 on realizing the dream of empiricist epistemol-ogists: the explicit construction of the external world, or a reasonable facsimile, from sense impressions, hence from simple ideas. He adumbrated it in Our Knowledge of the External World, and a dozen years later Rudolf Carnap was undertaking to carry it out. Carnap’s effort found expression in Der Logische Aufbau der Welt. (Quine 1995, p. 10).

Keywords

Smoke Logical Positivism Clarification Alan 

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© Peter Hylton 2013

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  • Peter Hylton

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