Abstract
Traditionally, ‘military strategy’ has referred to the planning and employment of military resources to win major campaigns against a foe or to achieve victory in war itself.1 Today the traditional emphasis in military victory is insufficient. Military strategy should be viewed not only as a narrow guide to combat activities, but as a guide to achieving security objectives in a broader sense.2 As Basil Liddell Hart has noted, ‘It is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire. This is the truth underlying Clausewitz’ definition of war as “a continuation of policy by other means” — the prolongation of that policy through the war into the subsequent peace must always be borne in mind.’3 It follows that deterrence, that is the prevention of war, is directly related to military strategy.
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Notes
See Karl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
See, among others, Edward Luttwalk, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
See Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1972), 366.
See Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
For an analysis of asymmetrical deterrence, see Athanassios Platias, ‘Asymmetrical deterrence’, in Aharon Klieman and Ariel Levite, eds, Deterrence in the Middle East: Where Theory and Practice Converge (Tel Aviv: Jaffa Center for Strategic Studies, 1993), 45–62.
See Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 13.
See also Edward Luttwalk, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from first Century AD to the Third (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976);
Paul Kennedy, ed., Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991);
and Charalambos Papasotiriou, Byzantine Grand Strategy, PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 1991.
See Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, eds, The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).
For an extensive discussion of this point, see Athanassios Platias, High Politics in Small Countries: An Inquiry into the Security Policies of Greece, Israel and Sweden, PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1986.
See, for example, John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
For an analysis in Greek, see A. G. Platias, The New International System: Realist Approach of International Relations (Athens: Papazisis, 1995).
For an analysis, see Government of Greece, White Paper (Athens: Hellenic Ministry of Defense, 1995), 17–18.
For a comprehensive review of the issues that have dominated the agenda, see Andrew Wilson, The Aegean Dispute (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 155, 1979). See also, Van Coufoudakis, ‘Greek-Turkish relations 1973–1983: the view from Athens’, International Security, 9 (Spring 1985).
See, for example, Baskin Oran, ‘The sleeping volcano in Turco-Greek relations: the Western Thrace minority’, in Kemal Karpat, ed., Turkish Foreign Policy: Recent Developments (Madison, Wis., 1996), 119–38.
For an analysis of the Turkish rearmament program, see Thanos Dokos and Nikos Protonatarios, The Military Power of Turkey: The Challenge for Greek Security (Athens: Tourikis, 1994 in Greek).
George Katsirdakis, ‘Military postures and doctrines of the South-East European countries’, in European Security in the 1990s: Problems of South-East Europe (New York: UNIDIR, 1992), 82.
See, for example, Jed Snyder, Defending the Fringe: NATO, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987).
Yiannis Roubatis, The US Involvement in the Army and Politics in Greece, 1946–1967, PhD dissertation, John Hopkins University, 1980.
See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 168.
See Government of Greece, White Paper. Also Theodore Stathis, National Defense (Athens: Livanis, 1992), 47–9.
Thomas Shelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 36.
For an analysis, see Athanassios Platias, ‘Naval arms control in the Eastern Mediterranean’, in Naval Arms Control After Gorbachev (London: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1992).
For a strategic analysis of the 1987 crisis, see A. G. Platias, ‘Greece’s strategic doctrine: in search of autonomy and deterrence’, in D. Constas, ed., The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1980s (London: Macmillan, 1991), 91–108.
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Platias, A.G. (2000). Greek Deterrence Strategy. In: Chircop, A., Gerolymatos, A., Iatrides, J.O. (eds) The Aegean Sea after the Cold War. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-08879-6_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-08879-6_6
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