Abstract
For the first century and a half, the president’s exercise of the war power was carefully and deliberately constrained by constitutional text, framers’ intent, custom, and the governing principle that, in a republican form of government, the decision to take the country to war rests with the elected representatives in Congress. Since World War II, presidential war power has expanded dramatically with few of the traditional legislative and judicial checks to constrain it. Presidents now announce they can go to war with another country when it is “the right thing to do.” These claims, unrelated to legal authority, subordinate republican government to presidential choice, exactly what the framers had hoped to avoid. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have shifted even greater power to the executive branch.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Julian Boyd ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 15 (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1958): 397.
David Gray Adler, “Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers: The Influence of the Judiciary,” in Michael W McCann & Gerald L. Houseman, eds., Judging the Constitution: Critical Essays on Judicial Lawmaking 158, 1989.
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2): 238, 239, 251, 258, 262.
The statements in this paragraph and the next appear in Max Farrand ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of’1787, 1 (1937): 64–66.
Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, ed. The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 which framed the Constitution of the United States: Reported by James Madison (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1987), 418.
Max Farrard, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1937), 318.
James Madison, Notes of Debates on the Federal Convention of 1787 (New York: WW Norton, 1966), 476.
Jonathan Elliot ed., The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 2 (1836–45): 528.
Maeva Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994).
Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect 1890–1952 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983): 569.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (New York: Doubleday, 1963).
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1965).
Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Da Capo Press, 1956): 337, 339, 519.
Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984): 175–176.
Edwin E. Mo, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).
Thomas F. Eagleton, War and Presidential Power: A Chronicle of Congressional Surrender (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1974), 213–220.
Robert C. Byrd, “Congress Must Resist the Rush to War,” New York Times, October 10, 2002, A35.
Congressman Lee H. Hamilton, “The Role of the Congress in U.S. Foreign Policy,” delivered to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 19, 1998, 1.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2004 Betty Glad and Chris J. Dolan
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Fisher, L. (2004). Expansion of the President’s War Power. In: Glad, B., Dolan, C.J. (eds) Striking First. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-08576-4_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-08576-4_9
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-73288-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-08576-4
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)