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Abstract

Though the term “alliance” has often been used loosely to mean simply “friendship” or “working partnership,”1 jurists and theorists have long insisted on a narrower definition, according to which an alliance is a treaty binding two or more independent states to come to each other’s aid with armed force under circumstances specified in the casus foederis article of the treaty. Whether offensive or defensive, limited or unlimited, equal or unequal, bilateral or multilateral, alliances must involve some measure of commitment to use force to achieve a common goal.2

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Notes

  1. For a discussion of various contradictory meanings of “balance of power,” see Ernst B. Haas, “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda,” World Politics, 5 (1953), 442–77.

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  2. Charles K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830–1841, 2 vols. (London, 1951); Charles K. Webster, “Palmerston, Metternich, and the European System 1830–1841,” Proceedings of the British Academy, 20 (1934), 125–58.

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  3. Rudolf Lill, “Die Vorgeschichte der preussisch-italienischen Allianz,” Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 42/43 (1963), 505–70.

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  4. Heinrich Lutz, “Von Königgrätz zum Zweibund. Aspekte europäischer Entscheidungen,” Historische Zeitschrift, 217 (1973), 347–80.

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  5. On Britain’s use of the Entente in 1911, see Keith Wilson, “The Agadir Crisis, the Mansion House Speech, and the Double-Edgedness of Agreements,” Historical Journal, 15 (1972), 513–32.

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  6. For a specific argument on this thesis, see Paul W. Schroeder, “World War I as Galloping Gertie: A Reply to Joachim Remak,” Journal of Modern History, 44 (1972), 319–45.

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  7. For evidence that the same realist vs. idealist debate long common in the West is also going on in postwar Japan, see Kei Wakaizumi, “Japan’s Dilemma: To Act or Not to Act,” Foreign Policy, 16 (Fall 1974), 33–35.

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Authors

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David Wetzel Robert Jervis Jack S. Levy

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© 2004 Paul W. Schroeder

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Schroeder, P.W. (2004). Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management. In: Wetzel, D., Jervis, R., Levy, J.S. (eds) Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-06138-6_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-06138-6_10

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4039-6358-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-137-06138-6

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